

proposed rule or the FAA's determination of the cost to the public.

After careful review of all available information related to the subject presented above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed except for minor editorial corrections. The FAA has determined that these minor corrections will not change the meaning of the AD and will not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed.

Cost Impact

The FAA estimates that 2,810 airplanes in the U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 12 workhours (average of 8 workhours for Kit 763-917 and 16 workhours for Kit 764-028) per airplane to accomplish the required installation, and that the average labor rate is approximately \$60 an hour. Parts cost approximately \$300 per airplane. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$2,866,200 or \$1,020 per airplane. This figure is based on the assumption that no affected airplane owner/operator has accomplished the required installation.

Piper has informed the FAA that bulkhead reinforcement kits have been distributed to equip at least 15 of the affected airplanes. Assuming that each of the kits has been incorporated on an affected airplane, the cost impact of this AD upon U.S. owners/operators of the affected airplanes will be reduced by \$15,300 from \$2,866,200 to \$2,850,900.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the final evaluation prepared for this action is

contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES**.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 USC 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 80-22-04, Amendment 39-3943, and by adding a new AD to read as follows:

96-12-12 The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (formerly Piper Aircraft Corporation): Amendment 39-9654; Docket No. 90-CE-60-AD. Supersedes AD 80-22-04, Amendment 39-3943.

Applicability: The following model and serial number airplanes, certificated in any category, that do not have either Piper Kit 764-028 or Piper Kit 763-917 incorporated at the Fuselage Station (FS) 317.75 bulkhead area:

Models	Serial Nos.
PA31, PA31-300, and PA31-325.	31-2 through 31-7912039.
PA31-350	31-5001 through 31-7952071.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished.

To prevent structural failure of the vertical fin forward spar caused by cracks in the FS 317.75 bulkhead, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following:

(a) Inspect the upper section of the FS 317.75 bulkhead for cracks in accordance with the INSTRUCTIONS section of Piper Service Bulletin No. 636A, dated August 26, 1980.

(1) If any crack is found, prior to further flight, incorporate Piper Kit 764-028 in accordance with the instructions included with that kit, revised June 18, 1990.

(2) If no crack is found, prior to further flight, incorporate Piper Kit 763-917 in accordance with the instructions included with that kit, revised June 18, 1980.

(b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), Campus Building, 1701 Columbia Avenue, suite 2-160, College Park, Georgia 30337-2748. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta ACO.

Note 3: Alternative methods of compliance approved in accordance with AD 80-22-04 (superseded by this action) are not considered approved as alternative methods of compliance with this AD.

(d) The inspection required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin No. 636A, dated August 26, 1980. The installation required by this AD shall be done in accordance with the instructions to Piper Kit 764-028, revised June 18, 1990, or Piper Kit 763-917, revised June 18, 1990, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from The New Piper Aircraft, Inc., 2926 Piper Drive, Vero Beach, Florida 32960. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(e) This amendment (39-9654) supersedes AD 80-22-04, Amendment 39-3943.

(f) This amendment (39-9654) becomes effective on July 16, 1996. Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on May 30, 1996.

John R. Colomy,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96-14174 Filed 6-5-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

14 CFR Part 39**[Docket No. 96-NM-61-AD; Amendment 39-9653; AD 96-12-11]****RIN 2120-AA64****Airworthiness Directives; Canadair Model CL-215-1A10 Series Airplanes****AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Canadair Model CL-215-1A10 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of the microswitches fitted at the water door actuator, and replacement of any discrepant microswitch. This action also requires a terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the water doors on one airplane opened inadvertently during flight, due to corrosion of the microswitches fitted to the water door actuator. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such uncommanded opening of the water doors, especially at high speed during a takeoff run, a water pick-up run, or a landing run, which could cause damage to the airplane.

DATES: Effective June 21, 1996.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of June 21, 1996.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before August 5, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-61-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Bombardier, Inc., Canadair Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, Station Centre-ville, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 10 Fifth Street, Third Floor, Valley Stream, New York; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michelle Maurer, Aerospace Engineer,

New York Aircraft Certification Office, Systems & Flight Test Branch (ANE-172), Engine and Propeller Directorate, 10 Fifth Street, Third Floor, Valley Stream, New York 11581; telephone (516) 256-7508; fax (516) 568-2716.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Transport Canada Aviation, which is the airworthiness authority for Canada, has notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on all Canadair Model CL-215-1A10 series airplanes. Transport Canada Aviation advises that there has been an incident in which the water doors on one airplane inadvertently opened during flight. Investigation revealed that the cause of this malfunction of the doors was due to corrosion of the microswitches that are fitted to the water door actuators. The uncommanded opening of these doors at high speed during the takeoff run, water pick-up run, or landing run could cause serious damage to the airplane.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

Canadair has issued Alert Service Bulletin 215-A363, dated March 16, 1987. This service bulletin describes procedures for (1) performing repetitive visual inspections to detect corrosion of the microswitches fitted to the water door actuator; (2) conducting repetitive resistance checks and insulation checks of the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) water door actuator microswitches; and (3) replacing any discrepant microswitch. Transport Canada Aviation classified this service bulletin as mandatory and issued Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-87-08 R1, dated December 7, 1990, in order to assure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in Canada.

Canadair also has issued Service Bulletin 215-389, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1991, which describes procedures for modifying the water door microswitches. The modification entails replacing the LH and RH water door actuator microswitches, installing a relay channel and two relays, and modifying related wiring. Transport Canada Aviation has classified this service bulletin as "recommended."

FAA's Conclusions

This airplane model is manufactured in Canada and is type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.19) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, Transport Canada Aviation has kept the FAA informed of the situation described

above. The FAA has examined the findings of Transport Canada Aviation, reviewed all available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Explanation of the Requirements of the Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design registered in the United States, this AD is being issued to prevent the inadvertent opening of the water doors during flight due to the problems associated with corrosion of the microswitches fitted at the water door actuator. This AD requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of these microswitches, and replacement of any discrepant microswitch. This AD requires modification of the water door microswitches as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. The actions are required to be accomplished in accordance with the service bulletins described previously.

Differences Between this AD and Related Canadian AD

Operators should note that this AD differs from the related Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-87-08 R1 in that this AD requires the accomplishment of the terminating action for the repetitive inspections of the microswitches. The FAA has determined that long term continued operational safety will be better assured by modifications or design changes to remove the source of the problem, rather than by repetitive inspections. Long term inspections may not be providing the degree of safety assurance necessary for the transport airplane fleet. This, coupled with a better understanding of the human factors associated with numerous repetitive inspections, has led the FAA to consider placing less emphasis on special procedures and more emphasis on design improvements. The modification requirement of this AD is in consonance with these considerations.

Cost Impact

None of the Model CL-215-1A10 series airplanes affected by this action are on the U.S. Register. All airplanes included in the applicability of this rule currently are operated by non-U.S. operators under foreign registry; therefore, they are not directly affected by this AD action. However, the FAA considers that this rule is necessary to ensure that the unsafe condition is

addressed in the event that any of these subject airplanes are imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the future.

Should an affected airplane be imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the future, it would require approximately 2 work hours to accomplish the required inspections, at an average labor charge of \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of these required inspections would be \$120 per airplane per inspection.

Accomplishment of the terminating modification would require approximately 40 work hours, at an average labor charge of \$60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately \$2,900 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this required modification would be \$5,300 per airplane.

Determination of Rule's Effective Date

Since this AD action does not affect any airplane that is currently on the U.S. register, it has no adverse economic impact and imposes no additional burden on any person. Therefore, notice and public procedures hereon are unnecessary and the amendment may be made effective in less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.

Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of a final rule and was not preceded by notice and opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified under the caption **ADDRESSES**. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 96-NM-61-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES**.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

96-12-11 Canadair: Amendment 39-9653.
Docket 96-NM-61-AD.

Applicability: Model CL-215-1A10 series airplanes, certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent in the inadvertent opening of the water doors due to corrosion associated with the microswitches fitted to the water door actuator, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, conduct an inspection to detect discrepancies of the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) microswitches, part number (P/N) 21EN9-6, fitted to the water door actuator, in accordance with paragraphs 2.D. and 2.E. of the Accomplishment Instructions of Canadair Alert Service Bulletin 215-A363, dated March 16, 1987.

(b) If no discrepancy is detected during the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, repeat the inspection in accordance with the following schedule:

(1) For microswitches that have accumulated less than 5 calendar years and less than 1,000 total flight hours at the time of the inspection: Repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 240 flight hours.

(2) For microswitches that have accumulated 5 or more calendar years, or 1,000 or more flight hours at the time of the inspection: Repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 50 flight hours.

(c) If any discrepancy is detected during an inspection required by paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish the action specified in either paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD:

(1) Replace the microswitch with a serviceable microswitch of the same part number in accordance with paragraph F. of the Accomplishment Instructions of Canadair Alert Service Bulletin 215-A363, dated March 16, 1987. After replacement, repeat the inspection in accordance with the schedule specified in paragraph (b) of this AD.

(2) Modify the water door microswitches in accordance with Canadair Service Bulletin 215-389, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1991. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD.

(d) Within 2 years after the effective date of this AD, modify the water door microswitches in accordance with Canadair Service Bulletin 215-389, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1991. This modification constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD.

Note 2: Accomplishment of this modification in accordance with Canadair

Service Bulletin 215-389, dated November 15, 1988, prior to the effective date of this AD, is considered acceptable for compliance with this paragraph.

(e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, New York ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the New York ACO.

(f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(g) The inspections shall be done in accordance with Canadair Alert Service Bulletin 215-A363, dated March 16, 1987. The modification shall be done in accordance with Canadair Service Bulletin 215-389, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Bombardier, Inc., Canadair Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, Station Centre-ville, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 10 Fifth Street, Third Floor, Valley Stream, New York; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(h) This amendment becomes effective on June 21, 1996.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 30, 1996.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96-14036 Filed 6-5-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 92-ANE-08; Amendment 39-8781; AD 93-25-17]

Airworthiness Directives; General Electric CT7 Series Turboprop and Turboshaft Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This document makes a correction to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 93-25-17 applicable to General Electric (GE) CT7 series turboprop and

turboshaft engines that was published in the Federal Register on January 3, 1994 (59 FR 3). The docket number in the header to the applicability section is incorrect. This document corrects the docket number. In all other respects, the original document remains the same.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 6, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dave Keenan, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803-5299; telephone (617) 238-7139, fax (617) 238-7199.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A final rule airworthiness directive applicable to General Electric (GE) CT7 series turboprop and turboshaft engines, was published in the Federal Register on January 3, 1994 (59 FR 3). The following correction is needed:

§ 39.13 [Corrected]

On page 4, in the first column, in the heading above the Applicability Section of AD 93-25-17, in the second line, "Docket No. 93-ANE-08" is corrected to read "Docket No. 92-ANE-08".

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on May 16, 1996.

Jay J. Pardee,

Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96-13888 Filed 6-5-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96-NM-56-AD; Amendment 39-9652; AD 96-12-10]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. This action requires either the application of a vapor sealant on the back of the receptacle of the auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder cable; or a visual inspection for gold-plating and evidence of damage of the connector contacts of the power feeder cable of the APU generator, and various follow-on actions. This amendment is prompted by reports of burning and arcing of these connector contacts. The actions specified in this AD are intended to

reduce the potential for a fire hazard as a result of such burning or arcing.

DATES: Effective June 21, 1996.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of June 21, 1996.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before August 5, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-56-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Technical Publications Business Administration, Department C1-L51 (2-60). This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Brett Portwood, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712; telephone (310) 627-5347; fax (310) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has received several reports of burning and arcing of the connector contacts (pins/sockets) of the power feeder cable of the auxiliary power unit (APU) generator on Model MD-11 series airplanes. This condition was indicated by the inability to electrically power the airplane using APU generator power. In all cases, the connector and receptacle were heat-damaged beyond repair. The associated power feeder cables also sustained heat damage. Investigation revealed that the connector contacts had been nickel plated during production. These connector contacts must be gold plated to be able to withstand the loads applied. Burning and arcing of the connector contacts of the power feeder cable of the APU generator, if not corrected, could result in potential fire hazard.