

Special Emphasis Panel in Polar Programs; Notice of Meeting

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting:

Name: Special Emphasis Panel in Polar Programs (1209).

Date and Time: August 27-28, 1996; 8 a.m.-5 p.m.

Place: Room 320, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230.

Type of Meeting: Closed.

Contact Person: Polly Penhale, Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230. Telephone: (703) 306-1033.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.

Agenda: To review and evaluate Antarctic Biology and Medicine Program proposals as part of the selection process for awards.

Reason for Closing: The proposals being reviewed include information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data, such as salaries and personal information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c) (4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: August 2, 1996.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 96-20136 Filed 8-6-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555-01-M

Advisory Committee for the NSF Science and Technology Centers (STC) Program; Notice of Meeting Amendment

The meeting announcement is being amended to change the type of meeting from Open to Part Open. The change was necessary to provide for two closed sessions. Specific details are included in the agenda, below. The notice of this meeting originally appeared on July 18. For the convenience of the reader, the entire meeting notice is being re-published:

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting:

Name: Advisory Committee for the NSF Science and Technology Centers Program.

Date and Time: August 8-9, 1996, 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

Place: Room 1235, NSF, 4201 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA.

Type of Meeting: Part Open.

Contact Person: Dr. Nathaniel G. Pitts, Director, Office of Science and Technology Infrastructure, Rm. 1270, 4201 Wilson Blvd.,

Arlington, VA 22230, Telephone: (703) 306-1040.

Purpose of Meeting: To advise the NSF on the future of its Science and Technology Centers Program.

Agenda

August 8, 1996

8:30 a.m.-9:00 a.m. Opening Remarks

9:00 a.m.-9:45 a.m. COSEPUP Report, William Brinkman

9:45 a.m.-10:15 a.m. Discussion of Directorate Advisory Committees' Recommendations

10:15 a.m. BREAK

10:30 a.m.-11:00 a.m. Role of Center in Directorate Long Range Plans

11:00 a.m.-12:15 p.m. Meetings with NSF Assistant Directors on the Management of Centers (CLOSED)

12:15 p.m.-1:15 p.m. LUNCH

1:15 p.m.-1:45 p.m. Split Matrix Management, Nat Pitts

1:45 p.m.-5:00 p.m. Discussion

August 9, 1996

8:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m. Discussion & Report Preparation

12:00 p.m.-1:00 p.m. LUNCH

1:00 p.m.-2:30 p.m. Report Preparation

2:30 p.m.-3:30 p.m. Discussion of Centers Management with Neal Lane, Director, NSF (CLOSED)

3:30-5 p.m. Report Preparation Continued (if necessary)

Reason for Closing: The discussions about the management of the Science and Technology Centers will include information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: August 1, 1996.

M. Rebecca Winkler,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 96-20137 Filed 8-6-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555-01-M

Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY HOLDING MEETING: National Science Foundation; National Science Board.

DATE AND TIME: August 15, 1996, 1:00 p.m., Closed Session; August 15, 1996, 3:30 p.m., Open Session.

PLACE: National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room 1235, Arlington, Virginia 22230.

STATUS: Part of this meeting will be open to the public. Part of this meeting will be closed to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

Thursday, August 15, 1996: Closed Session (1:00 p.m.-3:30 p.m.)

—Personnel

—Minutes, May & July 1996 Meetings

—Awards & Agreements

—NSF Budget

Thursday, August 15, 1996: Open Session (3:30 p.m.-4:15 p.m.)

—Minutes, May & July 1996 Meetings

—Closed Session Agenda Items—October 1996 Meeting

—Chairman's Report

—Director's Report

—Director's Report on Merit Review System

—Reports from Committees

—Other Business

—Adjourn

Marta Cehelsky,

Executive Officer.

[FR Doc. 96-20202 Filed 8-5-96; 9:09 am]

BILLING CODE 7555-01-M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366]

Georgia Power Company, et al. (Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

I

The Georgia Power Company, et al. (GPC or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Hatch). The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

II

Subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24, "Criticality Accident Requirements," requires that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain in each area where such material is handled, used, or stored, an appropriate criticality monitoring system. In accordance with Subsection (a)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24, coverage of all such areas at Hatch shall be provided by two criticality detectors. However, exemptions may be requested pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d), provided that the licensee believes that good cause exists for the exemption.

By letter dated June 4, 1996, the licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. Previous exemptions from the provisions of 10 CFR Part 70.24 for the storage of special nuclear material, including reactor fuel assemblies [maximum amount of 2,630 kg of U-235 in uranium enriched to no more than 3.0 weight percent (w/o)], were granted to Georgia Power Company for Hatch Unit 1 in NRC Materials License No. SNM-1378, issued on August 2, 1973; and for Hatch Unit 2 in NRC Materials License No. SNM-1772 issued on October 28, 1977, [maximum amount of 1,950 kg of U-235 in uranium enriched

to no more than 2.3 weight percent (w/o)]. The materials licenses expired upon conversion of the construction permits to operating licenses, which were August 6, 1974, for Unit 1, and June 13, 1978, for Hatch Unit 2. The basis for the current exemption request is the same as for the original request. Specifically, the licensee proposes to handle and store unirradiated fuel in the new fuel vault or the spent fuel pool without having a criticality monitoring system as required by 10 CFR 70.24.

The basis for the exemption is that the potential for accidental criticality is precluded because of the geometric spacing of fuel in the storage vault and administrative controls imposed on fuel handling procedures from the time the fuel is removed from approved shipping containers, until it is placed in specially designed storage racks.

Inadvertent or accidental criticality of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) while in use in the reactor vessel is precluded through compliance with the Hatch Technical Specifications, including reactivity requirements (e.g., shutdown margins, limits on control rod movement), instrumentation requirements (e.g., reactor power and radiation monitors), and controls on refueling operations (e.g., refueling equipment interlocks). In addition, the operators' attention directed toward instruments monitoring behavior of the nuclear fuel in the reactor assures the facility is operated in such a manner as to preclude inadvertent criticality. Finally, since access to the fuel in the reactor vessel is not physically possible while in use and is procedurally controlled during refueling, there are no concerns associated with loss or diversion of the fuel.

SNM as a nuclear fuel is stored in one of two locations—the spent fuel pool or the new fuel vault. The spent fuel pool is used to store irradiated fuel under water after its removal from the reactor. The pool is designed to store fuel in a geometric array that precludes criticality. In addition, existing Technical Specification limits on k_{eff} are maintained less than or equal to 0.95, even in the event of a fuel handling accident.

The new fuel vault is used to receive and store new fuel in a dry condition upon arrival on site and prior to loading in the reactor. The new fuel vault is designed to store new fuel in a geometric array that precludes criticality. In addition, existing safety evaluations demonstrate that an effective multiplication factor is maintained less than or equal to 0.95 when the new fuel racks are fully loaded and dry or flooded with

unborated water, or in the event of a fuel handling accident.

New fuel is shipped in a plastic wrap. When the fuel is removed from its transportation cask, the wrap is removed and the fuel is placed in the fuel inspection stand. Following inspection, the new fuel can either be placed in the new fuel storage vault or in the spent fuel pool (typically placed in the spent fuel pool). In no case is the plastic wrap reinserted on the fuel. Removal of the wrap requires it to be slit down the length of the new fuel assembly, thereby making its reuse highly unlikely. Therefore, there is no concern that the plastic wrap used as part of the new fuel package will be capable of holding water from flooding from overhead sources. Additionally, as discussed above, the new fuel storage racks were analyzed by the licensee for a postulated flooded condition, and the results show that k_{eff} is maintained less than or equal to 0.95.

Both irradiated and unirradiated fuel is moved to and from the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool to accommodate refueling operations. Also, unirradiated fuel can be moved to and from the new fuel vault. In addition, fuel movements into the facility and within the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool occur. Fuel movements are procedurally controlled and designed to preclude conditions involving criticality concerns. Moreover, previous accident analyses demonstrate that a fuel handling accident (i.e., a dropped fuel element) will not create conditions that exceed design specifications. In addition, the Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements Manuals specifically address refueling operations and limit the handling of fuel to ensure against an accidental criticality and preclude certain movements over the spent fuel pool and the reactor vessel.

Based upon the information provided, there is reasonable assurance that irradiated and unirradiated fuel will remain subcritical. The circumstances for granting an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 are met because criticality is precluded with the present design configuration, Technical Specification requirements, administrative controls, and the fuel handling equipment and procedures. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 is acceptable and should be granted.

III

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property

or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Georgia Power Company, et al., an exemption as described in Section II above from 10 CFR 70.24, "Criticality Accident Requirements" for Hatch Units 1 and 2.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the quality of the human environment (61 FR 36914).

This exemption is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96-20118 Filed 8-6-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

[Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364]

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2); Exemption

I

The Southern Nuclear Operating Company, et al. (SNC or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Farley). The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

II

Subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24, "Criticality Accident Requirements," requires that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material shall maintain in each area where such material is handled, used, or stored, an appropriate criticality monitoring system. In accordance with Subsection (a)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24, coverage of all such areas at Farley shall be provided by two criticality detectors. However, exemptions may be requested pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d), provided that the licensee believes that good cause exists for the exemption.

By letter dated May 31, 1996, the licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. A previous exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR Part 70.24 for the storage of special nuclear material, including reactor fuel assemblies [maximum amount of 1,900 kg of U-235 in uranium enriched to no more than 3.15 weight percent (w/o)], was granted to Alabama