

**NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION**

[Notice 97-120]

**NASA Advisory Council (NAC), Space Science Advisory Committee (SScAC); Meeting**

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

**SUMMARY:** In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 92-463, as amended, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the NASA Advisory Council, Space Science Advisory Committee.

**DATES:** Monday, September 22, 1997, 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; Tuesday, September 23, 1997, 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; Wednesday, September 24, 1997, 8:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.

**ADDRESSES:** Room MIC 7, NASA Headquarters, 300 E Street, SW, Washington, DC 20546.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Dr. Guenter R. Riegler, Code SR, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC 20546, 202/358-1588.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The meeting will be open to the public up to the capacity of the room. The agenda for the meeting is as follows:

- Status of prior SScAC recommendations
- Subcommittee Business
- Results from the OSS Strategic Planning Meeting
- Current OSS Strategic Plan

It is imperative that the meeting be held on these dates to accommodate the scheduling priorities of the key participants. Visitors will be requested to sign a visitor's register.

Dated: August 13, 1997.

**Leslie M. Nolan,**

*Advisory Committee Management Officer,  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.*

[FR Doc. 97-22100 Filed 8-20-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-M

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

**SUMMARY:** In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 92-463, as amended, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the NASA Advisory Council, Space Science Advisory Committee, ORIGINS Subcommittee.

**DATES:** Tuesday, September 16, 1997, 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; and Wednesday, September 17, 1997, 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

**ADDRESSES:** NASA Headquarters, Conference Room MIC 6-A/B West, 300 E Street, SW, Washington, DC 20546.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Dr. Edward J. Weiler, Code SA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC 20546, 202/358-2150.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The meeting will be closed to the public on Wednesday, September 17, 1997, from 8:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 522b(c)(6), to allow for discussion on qualifications of individuals being considered for membership to the Committee. The remainder of the meeting will be open to the public up to the capacity of the room. The agenda for the meeting includes the following topics:

- ORIGINS Programmatic Update
- Institute Concepts/Status
  - Astrobiology-Underlying Concepts
  - Astrobiology-Management/CAN Status
- ORIGINS Institutes
- OSS Strategic Plan/Status
- ORIGINS Roadmap: Issues & Implementation
- JPL Interferometry Program/Status

It is imperative that the meeting be held on these dates to accommodate the scheduling priorities of the key participants. Visitors will be requested to sign a visitor's register.

Dated: August 15, 1997.

**Leslie M. Nolan,**

*Advisory Committee Management Officer,  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.*

[FR Doc. 97-22253 Filed 8-20-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-M

**SUMMARY:** The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454 (Section 405) requires that appointments of individual members to a Performance Review Board be published in the **Federal Register**.

The performance review function for the Senior Executive Service in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is being performed by the NASA Performance Review Board (PRB) and the NASA Senior Executive Committee. The latter performs this function for senior executives who report directly to the Administrator or the Deputy Administrator and members of the PRB. The following individuals are serving on the Board and the Committee:

**Performance Review Board**

Robert E. Whitehead, Chairperson, Associate Administrator for Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology, NASA Headquarters  
John T. Pennington, Executive Secretary, Chief, Agency Executive Personnel Branch, NASA Headquarters

Vicki A. Novak, Director, Personnel Division, NASA Headquarters  
Robert M. Stephens, Deputy General Counsel, NASA Headquarters  
Oceola S. Hall, Deputy Associate Administrator for Equal Opportunity Programs, NASA Headquarters  
Michael A. Greenfield, Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA Headquarters

Gregory M. Reck, Deputy Chief Technologist, NASA Headquarters  
Richard J. Wisniewski, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight, NASA Headquarters  
William F. Townsend, Deputy Associate Administrator for Mission to Planet Earth (Programs), NASA Headquarters  
Earle K. Huckins, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science, NASA Headquarters

Geoffrey H. Vincent, Deputy Associate Administrator for Public Affairs, NASA Headquarters  
Martin P. Kress, Deputy Director, NASA Lewis Research Center  
James L. Jennings, Deputy Director for Business Operations, NASA Kennedy Space Center  
William E. Berry, Acting Deputy Director, NASA Ames Research Center  
Carolyn S. Griner, Deputy Director, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center

**Senior Executive Committee**

J.R. Dailey, Chairperson, Associate Deputy Administrator, NASA Headquarters

**NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION**

[Notice 97-122]

**NASA Advisory Council (NAC), Space Science Advisory Committee (SScAC), Astronomical Search for Origins and Planetary Systems (ORIGINS) Subcommittee; Meeting**

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

**NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION**

[Notice (97-123)]

**Performance Review Board, Senior Executive Service**

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

ACTION: Notice of Membership of SES Performance Review Board.

Vicki A. Novak, Executive Director,  
Personnel Division, NASA  
Headquarters

Michael I. Mott, Associate Deputy  
Administrator (Technical), NASA  
Headquarters

Robert E. Whitehead, Associate  
Administrator for Aeronautics and  
Space Transportation Technology,  
NASA Headquarters

Spence M. Armstrong, Associate  
Administrator for Human Resources  
and Education, NASA Headquarters

**Daniel S. Goldin,**

*Administrator.*

[FR Doc. 97-22254 Filed 8-20-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-M

## NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

### Telecommunications Service Priority System Oversight Committee

**AGENCY:** National Communications  
System (NCS).

**ACTION:** Notice of meeting.

A meeting of the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) System Oversight Committee will convene Thursday September 25, 1997 from 9 a.m. to 12:00 a.m. The meeting will be held at Booz-Allen & Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Drive, McLean VA.

—Opening/Administrative Remarks

—Status of the TSP Program

—Working Group Reports

—CPAS Program Update

Anyone interested in attending or presenting additional information to the Committee, please contact LCDR Angela Abrahamson, Manager, TSP Program Office, (703) 607-4930, or Betty Hoskin (703) 607-4932 by September 15, 1997.

**Frank M. McClelland,**

*Acting Federal Register Liaison Officer,  
National Communications System.*

[FR Doc. 97-22125 Filed 8-20-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3610-05-M

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389]

### Florida Power and Light Company, et al., St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2; Exemption

#### I

The Florida Power and Light Company, *et al.* (FPL or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16, which authorize operation of the St. Lucie

Plant, Units 1 and 2. The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors at the licensee's site located in St. Lucie County, Florida.

#### II

Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, "Criticality Accident Requirements," requires that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the relief requested.

#### III

The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that is stored on site is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, and has determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets the following seven criteria:

1. Only one fuel assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or storage rack at one time.

2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.

3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.

4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.

5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than the quantity necessary for a critical mass.

6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.

7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight percent.

By letter dated February 19, 1997, and supplemented July 10, 1997, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request the licensee addressed the seven criteria given above. The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and has determined that St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, meets the criteria for prevention of inadvertent criticality; therefore, the staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality to