

Marketing Division during normal business hours.

Done at Washington, DC this 14th day of November 1997.

**Daniel L. Van Ackeren,**

*Director, Livestock Marketing Division,  
Packers and Stockyards Programs.*

[FR Doc. 97-30878 Filed 11-24-97; 8:45 am]

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## DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

### Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration

#### Posting of Stockyards

Pursuant to the authority provided under Section 302 of the Packers and Stockyards Act (7 U.S.C. 202), it was ascertained that the livestock markets named below were stockyards as defined by Section 302(a). Notice was given to the stockyard owners and to the public as required by Section 302(b), by posting notices at the stockyards on the dates specified below, that the stockyards were subject to the provisions of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended (7 U.S.C. 181 *et seq.*).

Facility No., name, and location of stockyard	Date of posting
AR-173, Centerton Livestock Auction, Centerton, Arkansas.	Oct. 6, 1997.
KY-175, Kentucky Livestock Exchange, Owenton, Kentucky.	Oct. 28, 1997.
NC-172, Martin County Horse Auction, Oak City, North Carolina.	Oct. 23, 1997.

Done at Washington, DC this 14th day of November 1997.

**Daniel L. Van Ackeren,**

*Director, Livestock Marketing Division,  
Packers and Stockyards Programs.*

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## DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

### Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration

#### Deposting of Stockyards

Notice is hereby given, that the livestock markets named herein, originally posted on the dates specified below as being subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended (7 U.S.C. 181 *et seq.*), no longer come within the definition of a stockyard under the Act and are therefore, no

longer subject to the provisions of the Act.

Facility No., name, and location of stockyard	Date of posting
KS-115, Concordia Livestock Auction, Concordia, Kansas.	May 7, 1952.
MD-119, Kolb's Sale Barn, Woodsboro, Maryland.	June 3, 1996.
NC-138, Wells Livestock Market, Inc., Wallace, North Carolina.	July 10, 1959.
NC-150, Jefferson Stockyard & Grill, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina.	Nov. 22, 1978.
TX-162, El Paso Livestock Auction Co., Inc., El Paso, Texas.	Nov. 15, 1967.
VA-110, Southside Livestock Markets, Inc., Farmville, Virginia.	Mar. 20, 1961.
WA-121, Sunnyside Livestock Market, Inc., Sunnyside, Washington.	Oct. 5, 1959.

This notice is in the nature of a change relieving a restriction and, thus, may be made effective in less than 30 days after publication in the **Federal Register** without prior notice or other public procedure. This notice is given pursuant to section 302 of the Packers and Stockyards Act (7 U.S.C. 202) and is effective upon publication in the **Federal Register**.

Done at Washington, DC this 14th day of November 1997.

**Daniel L. Van Ackeren,**

*Director, Livestock Marketing Division,  
Packers and Stockyards Programs.*

[FR Doc. 97-30879 Filed 11-24-97; 8:45 am]

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## DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

### Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures

**AGENCY:** Department of Commerce.

**ACTION:** Notice of availability and request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** The Department of Commerce announces the availability of and seeks public comment on "Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures," the report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. The Commission was established by Executive Order in July 1996 to conduct a comprehensive study of the physical and electronic ("cyber") threats to and vulnerabilities of the nation's critical infrastructures and recommend a national policy for protecting the infrastructures and assuring their continued operation. The executive

order provided for a Commission comprised 10 members from the Federal government and 10 members from outside the Federal government. When the Commission terminated on October 13, 1997, some of the Commission's staff was retained to assist the Principals Committee, Steering Committee, and Advisory Committee in reviewing the report and preparing recommendations to the President. Notwithstanding the substantial public input that went into development of the Commission's findings and recommendations, their significance makes them worthy of additional public discussion and comment.

**DATES:** Comments should be submitted no later than January 9, 1998.

**REPORT AVAILABILITY AND ADDRESSES:** The report is available electronically from the Commission's transition office site on the World Wide Web: <http://www.pccip.gov/>.

Comments may be sent to the Commission at P.O. Box 46258, Washington, DC 20050-6258. Comments may also be submitted by facsimile to 202-696-9411, or by electronic mail to [Comments@pccip.gov](mailto:Comments@pccip.gov). Comments submitted by facsimile or electronic mail need not also be submitted by regular mail.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** The Commission at 703-696-9395.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** Executive Order 13010 of July 15, 1996 (61 FR 37347), as amended, established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and its associated Principals Committee, Steering Committee, and Advisory Committee as described below. A complete text of the Executive Order may also be found at the Commission's website (<http://www.pccip.gov>).

#### A Statement of the Problem

Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government services. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to tangible property ("physical threats"), and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or communications

components that control critical infrastructures ("cyber threats"). Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their continued operation.

#### Commission Membership

The Commission comprised one member each from the Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, Department of Energy, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency. These agencies also appointed members from the private sector. The Commission Chair was designated by the President from the private sector.

#### The Principals Committee

The Commission reported to the President through a Principals Committee, which is charged to review any reports or recommendations before submission to the President. The Principals Committee comprises the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the National Economic Council, and Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

#### The Steering Committee

The Commission's day-to-day work was overseen by a Steering Committee on behalf of the Principals Committee. The Steering Committee comprised five members: The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Deputy National Security Advisor, the Vice President's Domestic Policy Advisor and the Chair of the Commission itself. The Steering Committee received regular reports on the progress of the Commission's work and approved the submission of reports to the Principals Committee.

#### Advisory Committee

The Commission received advice from an Advisory Committee composed of

individuals appointed by the President from the private sector, academia, and local government who were knowledgeable about critical infrastructures. The Committee will study the report and provide advice to the Steering Committee.

#### Mission

As provided in the Executive Order, the Commission was to consult with the public and private sector owners and operators of the critical infrastructures and others that have an interest in critical infrastructure assurance issues and that may have differing perspectives on these issues. The Commission was to assess the scope and nature of threats to and vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures; determine the legal and policy issues raised by efforts to protect critical infrastructures and assess how they might be addressed; recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation strategy for protecting critical infrastructures and assuring their continued operation; and propose any statutory or regulatory changes necessary to effect its recommendations.

#### Sector Studies

The Commission divided its work into these five "sectors" based on the common characteristics of the included industries:

- Information and communications.
- Banking and finance.
- Energy, including electrical power, and oil and gas production and storage.
- Physical distribution, including transportation and oil and gas distribution.
- Vital human services, including water supply, emergency services and government services.

#### Public Hearings and Outreach

The Commission conducted extensive meetings with a range of professional and trade associations concerned with the infrastructures, private sector infrastructure users and providers, academia, state and local government agencies, consumers, federal agencies, and many others. Of special interest were five public meetings in five major cities.

#### Overview of the Report's Findings

*1. New Thinking is Required in Cyberspace.* It is not surprising that infrastructures have always been attractive targets for those who would do us harm. In the past we have been protected from hostile attacks on the infrastructures by broad oceans and friendly neighbors. Today, the evolution of cyber threats has changed the

situation dramatically. In cyberspace, national borders are no longer relevant.

Potentially serious cyber attacks can be conceived and planned without detectable logistic preparation. They can be invisibly reconnoitered, clandestinely rehearsed, and then mounted in a matter of minutes or even seconds without revealing the identity and location of the attacker.

Formulas that carefully divide responsibility between foreign defense and domestic law enforcement no longer apply as clearly as they used to and, in some instances, you may have to solve the crime before you can decide who has the authority to investigate it.

*2. We Should Act Now to Protect our Future.* The Commission has not discovered an imminent attack or a credible threat sufficient to warrant a sense of immediate national crisis. However, the Commission found that our vulnerabilities are increasing steadily while the costs associated with an effective attack continue to drop. The investments required to improve the situation are still relatively modest, but will rise if we procrastinate.

*3. Infrastructure Assurance is a Shared Responsibility.* National security requires much more than military strength. While no nation state is likely to invade our territory or attack our armed forces, we are inevitably the target of ill will and hostility from some quarters. Disruption of the services on which our economy and well-being depend could have significant effects, and if repeated frequently, could seriously harm public confidence. Because our military and private infrastructures are becoming less and less separate, because it is getting harder to differentiate threats from local criminals from those from foreign powers, and because the techniques of protection, mitigation, and restoration are largely the same, we conclude that responsibility for infrastructure protection and assurance can no longer be delegated on the basis of who the attacker is or where the attack originates. Rather, the responsibility should be shared cooperatively among all of the players.

#### Overview of the Report's Recommendations

*1. A Broad Program of Education and Awareness.* Possible undertakings include White House conferences, National Academy of Science studies, presentations at industry and government associations and professional societies, development and promulgation of elementary and secondary curricula, and sponsorship of graduate studies and programs.

2. *Infrastructure Protection through Industry Cooperation and Information Sharing.* Sector-by-sector cooperation and information sharing would take place in the context of partnerships between owners and operators and government. These partnerships would identify and share best practices. The National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Energy's National Laboratories would provide technical skills and expertise required to identify and evaluate vulnerabilities in the associated information networks and control systems. Sector cooperation might begin with sharing information and techniques related to risk management assessments. This could evolve into the development and deployment of ways to prevent attacks, and if attacks occur, to mitigate damage, quickly recover services, and reconstitute the infrastructure.

3. *Reconsideration of Laws Related to Infrastructure Protection.* Some laws capable of promoting infrastructure assurance efforts are not as clear or effective as they could be. Others operate in ways that may be unfriendly to security concerns. Sorting them all out will be a lengthy and complex undertaking, involving efforts at local, state, federal, and international levels. The report identifies specific existing laws that could be modified to support infrastructure protection.

4. *A Revised Program of Research and Development.* While some of the basic technology needed to improve infrastructure protection already exists, it is not yet widely deployed. In all areas of activities aimed at protecting and assuring the infrastructure, mitigating damages, and responding and recovering from attacks, additional research effort is needed. The Commission recommends increasing government spending in research and development on capabilities such as intrusion detection.

5. *A National Organization Structure.* To implement the recommendations the following new organizations and revised roles for existing organizations are recommended:

*Office of National Infrastructure Assurance* as the top-level policy making office connected closely to the National Security Council and the National Economic Council;

*Infrastructure Assurance Support Office* to house the bulk of the staff that would be responsible for follow-through on the Commission's recommendations;

*Information Sharing and Analysis Center* to begin the step-by-step process of establishing a realistic understanding

of distinguishing actual attacks from coincidental events;

*National Infrastructure Assurance Council* of industry CEOs, Cabinet Secretaries, and representatives of state and local government to provide policy advice and implementation commitment;

*Lead Agencies*, designated within the Federal government, to serve as a conduit from the government into each sector and to facilitate the creation of sector coordinators, if needed; and

*Sector Coordinators* to provide the focus for industry cooperation and information sharing, and to represent the sector in matters of national cooperation and policy;

*Warning Center* to identify anomalous events indicating that the infrastructure is under attack and alert the Information Sharing and Analysis Center for dissemination of bulletins and threat advisories to infrastructure stakeholders.

**William Reinsch,**

*Under Secretary of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration.*

[FR Doc. 97-30851 Filed 11-24-97; 8:45 am]

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## DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

### Bureau of the Census

#### **The Census Advisory Committee (CAC) on the African American Population, the CAC on the American Indian and Alaska Native Populations, the CAC on the Asian and Pacific Islander Populations, and the CAC on the Hispanic Population**

**AGENCY:** Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce.

**ACTION:** Notice of public meeting.

Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463 as amended by Pub. L. 94-409, Pub. L. 96-523, and Pub. L. 97-375), we are giving notice of a joint meeting followed by separate and concurrently held (described below) meetings of the CAC on the African American Population, the CAC on the American Indian and Alaska Native Populations, the CAC on the Asian and Pacific Islander Populations, and the CAC on the Hispanic Population. The joint meeting will convene on December 11-12, 1997 at the Bureau of the Census, Francis Amasa Walker Conference Center, Federal Building 3, 4700 Silver Hill Road, Suitland Maryland 20746.

Each of these Committees is composed of nine members appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. They provide an organized and continuing

channel of communication between the communities they represent and the Bureau of the Census on its efforts to reduce the differential in the population totals from Census 2000 and on ways that decennial census data can be disseminated to maximize their usefulness to these communities and other users.

The Committees will draw on past experience with the 1990 census process and procedures, results of evaluations and research studies, and the expertise and insight of their members to provide advice and recommendations during the research and development, design, planning and implementation phases of Census 2000.

The agenda for the December 11 combined meeting, which will begin at 9 a.m. and end at 5 p.m., is as follows: (1) Introductory Remarks and Updates; (2) What Is the Master Activity Schedule? How Will it Work for Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal Plans?; and (3) Building Partnerships.

The agendas for the four separate committees in the concurrent meetings held at various times during the day are as follows:

*The CAC on the African American Population:* (1) Review Issues From Last Meeting; (2) Discussants' Review of the Topics for the Plenary Sessions; (3) Review Responses to Recommendations; and (4) Discussion of Topics with Staff.

*The CAC on the American Indian and Alaska Native Populations:* (1) Review Issues From Last Meeting; (2) Discussants' Review of the Topics for the Plenary Sessions; (3) Review Responses to Recommendations; and (4) Discussion of Topics with Staff.

*The CAC on the Asian and Pacific Islander Populations:* (1) Review Issues From Last Meeting; (2) Discussants' Review of the Topics for the Plenary Sessions; (3) Review Responses to Recommendations; and (4) Discussion of Topics with Staff.

*The CAC on the Hispanic Population:* (1) Review Issues From Last Meeting; (2) Discussants' Review of the Topics for the Plenary Sessions; (3) Review Responses to Recommendations; and (4) Discussion of Topics with Staff.

The agenda for the December 12 combined meeting, which will begin at 8:45 a.m. and end at 4:15 p.m., is as follows: (1) Report on the 2000 Census Advisory Committee Meetings; (2) Process of Determining the Final Proposals on Tabulation of Race and Ethnic Data in Federal Statistical Systems; (3) How Will the OMB Proposal on Tabulation of Race and Ethnic Data Be Implemented in the Dress Rehearsal Tabulations? (4) What Standard Products Should the Census