example, several licensees informed the NRC staff that their completion dates had slipped by 6 months to as much as 3 years. For plants that have completion action scheduled beyond 1997, the NRC staff has met with these licensees to discuss the progress of the licensees' corrective actions and the extent of licensee management attention regarding completion of Thermo-Lag corrective actions. In addition, the NRC staff discussed with licensees the possibility of accelerating their completion schedules.

Crystal River Unit 3 was one of the plants that have completion action scheduled beyond 1997. Based on the information submitted by FPC in its April 10, 1998 submittal, the NRC staff has concluded that the schedule presented by FPC is reasonable. This conclusion is based on (1) the amount of installed Thermo-Lag, (2) the complexity of the plant-specific fire barrier configurations and issues, (3) the need to perform certain plant modifications during outages as opposed to those that can be performed while the plant is at power, and (4) integration with other significant, but unrelated issues that FPC is addressing at its plant. In order to remove compensatory measures such as fire watches, it has been determined that resolution of the Thermo-Lag corrective actions by FPC must be completed in accordance with the current FPC schedule. By letter dated April 23, 1998, the NRC staff notified FPC of its plan to incorporate FPC's schedule commitment into a requirement by issuance of an order and requested consent from the Licensee. By letter dated May 6, 1998, the Licensee provided its consent to issuance of a Confirmatory Order.

#### TTT

The Licensee's commitment as set forth in its letter of May 6, 1998, is acceptable and is necessary for the NRC to conclude that public health and safety are reasonably assured. To preclude any schedule slippage and to assure public health and safety, the NRC staff has determined that the Licensee's commitment in its May 6, 1998, letter be confirmed by this Order. The Licensee has agreed to this action. Based on the above, and the Licensee's consent, this Order is immediately effective upon issuance.

### IV

Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR

Part 50, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that:

Florida Power Corporation shall complete final implementation of Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire barrier corrective actions at Crystal River Unit 3 described in the Florida Power Corporation submittal to the NRC dated April 10, 1998, by June 30, 2000.

The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, may relax or rescind, in writing, any provisions of this Confirmatory Order upon a showing by the Licensee of good cause.

#### V

Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other than the Licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attention: Chief, Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, Atlanta Federal Center, 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85, Atlanta, GA 30303, and to the Licensee. If such a person requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his/her interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address criteria set forth in 10 CFR

If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any such hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be sustained.

In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions specified in Section IV above shall be final 20 days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been received.

An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this Order.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 21st day of May 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. **Samuel J. Collins**,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98-14389 Filed 5-29-98; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

# NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-331]

## IES Utilities Inc.; Notice of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued Amendment No. 223 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 issued to IES Utilities Inc., (the licensee), which revised the operating license and the Technical Specifications for operation of the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC), located in Linn County, Iowa. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to October 1, 1998.

The amendment modified the Technical Specifications by replacing the existing Technical Specifications in their entirety with a new set of Improved Technical Specifications based on NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants BWR/4," Revision 1, dated April 1995, and on guidance provided in the Commission's "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors," published on July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132). The amendment also modified the license by adding a new license condition which established an Appendix B to the license for additional license conditions. For this amendment, a condition was added to Appendix B describing the relocation of certain Technical Specification requirements to licensee controlled documents. In addition to replacing the Technical Specifications with the Improved Technical Specifications, the amendment revised the combinations of emergency core cooling systems/ subsystems that may be out of service and relaxed the required flowrates for the core spray, the low pressure coolant injection, and the high pressure coolant injection systems.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and

requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity for a Hearing in connection with this action as it applies to the Improved Technical Specifications was published in the Federal Register on July 22, 1997 (62 FR 39283). No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice. The Commission has prepared an Environmental Assessment related to the action and has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement. Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission has concluded that the issuance of the amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment (63 FR 13078, dated March 17, 1998)

Notices of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operation License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing in connection with this action as it applies to the revised combinations of emergency core cooling systems/ subsystems that may be out of service and to the relaxed required flowrates for the core spray, the low pressure coolant injection, and the high pressure coolant injection systems were published in the Federal Register on December 31, 1997 (62 FR 68306) and February 11, 1998 (63 FR 6986), respectively. No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following these notices and no significant hazards consideration comments were received.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment dated October 30, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated June 10, September 5, 17, and 30, October 16, November 18 and 21, December 8 and 15, 1997, January 2, 5, 12, 22 and 23, February 10, 26, March 23, 31, and April 17, 1998, (2) Amendment No. 223 to License No. DPR-49, (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation, and (4) the Commission's Environmental Assessment. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the local public document room located at the Cedar Rapids Public Library, 500

First Street, SE., Cedar Rapids, IA 52401.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of May 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. **Richard J. Laufer**,

Project Manager, Project Directorate III-3, Division of Reactor Projects, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–14392 Filed 5–29–98; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

# NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-298]

In the Matter of: Nebraska Public Power District (Cooper Nuclear Station); Exemption

I

The Nebraska Public Power District (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License No. DRP–46, which authorizes operation of the Cooper Nuclear Station. The license provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of one boilingwater reactor at the licensee's site located in Nemaha County, Nebraska.

#### II

Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, "Criticality Accident Requirements," requires that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees

to have a means to identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the relief requested.

### Ш

The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at Cooper Nuclear Station is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that is stored on site in any given location is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at Cooper Nuclear Station, and has determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets the following seven criteria:

- 1. Only three new assemblies are allowed out of a shipping cask or storage rack at one time.
- 2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.
- 3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the keffective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U–235 enrichment and flooded with a moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
- 4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.
- 5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given