

standards of practice for medical physicists.

Response. The Commission agrees that AAPM standards of practice for professionals involved in the use of certain byproduct material modalities and for radiation safety equipment should be considered as part of NRC's risk-informed and performance-based approaches to regulating the medical use of byproduct material. The Commission acknowledges that these and other standards of practice are often voluntary and, as such, medical professionals are not required to follow them. Therefore, where appropriate, the NRC focused part 35 on performance objectives to be achieved by licensees and is allowing licensees to select among the various performance standards to meet the objective of the regulation. This provides a licensee significant flexibility in designing its radiation protection program.

For example, in developing the final rule for the therapeutic uses of sealed sources, the NRC consulted several AAPM Radiation Therapy Committee Reports, including: Task Group 40 (Comprehensive QA for Radiation Oncology, 1994); Task Group 56 (Code of Practice for Brachytherapy Physics, 1998); Task Group 59 (HDR Treatment Delivery Safety, 1997 Draft); and AAPM Report No. 54 (Stereotactic Radiosurgery, 1995).

In addition to the AAPM, other groups and societies set professional radiation safety and practice standards for medical use. NRC plans to review such standards for possible use in developing regulatory positions (e.g., National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Health Physics Society, and Society of Nuclear Medicine).

Issue 3: Does the Existence of Professional Standards Mean That NRC Regulation Is Unnecessary?

Comment. Several commenters expressed the opinion that NRC regulations were unnecessary. They believe that NRC should not make regulations or license conditions out of industry or professional standards, because that reduces flexibility (i.e., regulations cannot evolve as quickly and easily as professional standards). In their opinion, NRC should recognize that these standards are implemented by other appropriate oversight bodies and that the existence of professional standards should signal to the NRC that regulation is unnecessary. Finally, these commenters indicated that a mechanism is needed to require the NRC to justify why an implemented industry standard is not acceptable.

Response. The Commission disagrees with the comment about professional standards necessarily replacing NRC's radiation safety requirements. Many of the professional standards are voluntary in nature, do not have the force of law, and may not meet the definition of a consensus standard under the NTTAA. As such, not all professional standards are adequate to meet the Commission's objectives for the regulation of medical use of byproduct material.

The Commission must consider industry consensus standards before a "government-unique standard" is promulgated. The process is described in NRC Management Directive 6.5, "NRC Participation in the Development and Use of Consensus Standards." Further information on this topic is available on the NRC's web site, www.nrc.gov/reference_library/standards_program/reference_documents, e.g., Public Law 104-113, "National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 1995" (NTTAA), OMB Circular on implementation of the NTTAA, NRC Annual Standards Reports (listings of consensus standards endorsed by NRC).

For example, NRC reviewed the technical literature to identify consensus standards and protocols that could be used or referenced in the rule and guidance document, thereby avoiding promulgation of "government-unique standards" when revising the MPS, 10 CFR part 35, and NUREG 1556 (Volume 9). Part 35, subparts C, F, and H, describe various performance objectives to be achieved (e.g., calibration of survey instruments, calibration of radiation sources used for manual brachytherapy and used in radiation therapy devices, and acceptance testing of treatment planning computers). A licensee may use measurements provided by the source manufacturer or by a calibration laboratory accredited by the AAPM. Alternatively, a licensee may select and implement an appropriate voluntary performance standard from a published protocol that was accepted by a nationally recognized body in order to meet the performance objectives of these regulations. This approach is consistent with the Commission's goal to develop regulations that are more performance-based. The Commission believes this approach provides significant flexibility for medical use licensees to design radiation protection programs that, when fully implemented, maintain radiation exposures to workers, patients, and the public to levels that are as low as are reasonably achievable.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of July, 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette L. Vietti-Cook,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 00-19573 Filed 8-2-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000-NM-100-AD; Amendment 39-11843; AD 2000-15-11]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration. This amendment requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement to ensure that the main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked; inspection of the door wire bundle to detect discrepancies and repair or replacement of discrepant parts. This amendment also requires, among other actions, modification of the hydraulic and indication systems of the main deck cargo door, and modification of the existing means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that certain main deck cargo door systems and the existing means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked, do not provide an adequate level of safety. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane including possible loss of flight control or severe structural damage.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 7, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Information pertaining to this AD may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael E. O'Neil, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5320; fax (562) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration, was published in the **Federal Register** on May 16, 2000 (65 FR 31109). That action proposed to require a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) to ensure that the main deck cargo door is closed, latched, and locked; inspection of the door wire bundle to detect discrepancies and repair or replacement of discrepant parts. That action also proposed to require, among other actions, modification of the hydraulic and indication systems of the main deck cargo door, and modification of the existing means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not closed, latched, and locked.

Comments

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. No comments were submitted in response to the proposal or the FAA's determination of the cost to the public.

Explanation of Change Made to Final Rule

Since the issuance of the proposed rule, the FAA has reviewed and approved installation of National Aircraft Service Inc. (NASI) Vent Door System Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST01245CH as an approved means of compliance with the requirements of paragraph (c) of the final rule. A new note (Note 3) has been added to the final rule to give credit for this installation, and the remaining notes have been renumbered accordingly.

Conclusion

After careful review of the available data, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule with the change previously described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 5 Model DC-8 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 4 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD.

It will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the general visual inspections, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the general visual inspections required by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$240, or \$60 per airplane, per inspection cycle.

It will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the AFMS revision and installation of associated placards, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the AFMS revision and installation of associated placards required by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$240, or \$60 per airplane.

The FAA estimates that it will take approximately 210 work hours per airplane to accomplish the modification required by paragraph (c) of this AD, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. The FAA also estimates that required parts will cost approximately \$45,000 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this modification required by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$230,400, or \$57,600 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is

determined that this final rule does not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES**.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

2000-15-11 McDonnell Douglas:

Amendment 39-11843. Docket 2000-NM-100-AD.

Applicability: Model DC-8 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA1862SO; certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane including possible loss of flight control or severe structural damage, accomplish the following:

Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Door

(a) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish a general visual inspection of the wire bundle of the main deck cargo door between the exit point of the cargo liner and the attachment point on the main deck cargo door to detect crimped, frayed, or chafed wires; and perform a general visual inspection for damaged, loose, or missing hardware mounting components. If any crimped, frayed, or chafed wire, or damaged, loose, or missing hardware mounting component is detected, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with FAA-approved maintenance procedures.

Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection is defined as "A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or irregularity. This level of inspection is made under normally available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or drop-light, and may require removal or opening of access panels or doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain proximity to the area being checked."

(b) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the appropriate FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) for STC SA1862SO by inserting therein procedures to ensure that the main deck cargo door is fully closed, latched, and locked prior to dispatch of the airplane, and install any associated placards. The AFMS revision procedures and installation of any associated placards shall be accomplished in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo Door Systems

(c) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the actions specified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5) of this AD in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

(1) Modify the indication system of the main deck cargo door to indicate to the pilots whether the main deck cargo door is fully closed, latched, and locked;

(2) Modify the mechanical and hydraulic systems of the main deck cargo door to eliminate detrimental deformation of

elements of the door latching and locking mechanism;

(3) Install a means to visually inspect the locking mechanism of the main deck cargo door;

(4) Install a means to remove power to the door while the airplane is in flight; and

(5) Install a means to prevent pressurization to an unsafe level if the main deck cargo door is not fully closed, latched, and locked.

Note 3: Installation of National Aircraft Service Inc. (NASI) Vent Door System STC ST01245CH, is an approved means of compliance with the requirements of paragraph (c) of this AD.

(d) Compliance with paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, and the AFMS revision and placards may be removed.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 4: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

Special Flight Permit

(f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Effective Date

(g) This amendment becomes effective on September 7, 2000.

Appendix 1

Excerpt from an FAA Memorandum to Director-Airworthiness and Technical Standards of ATA, dated March 20, 1992

“(1) Indication System:

(a) The indication system must monitor the closed, latched, and locked positions, directly.

(b) The indicator should be *amber* unless it concerns an outward opening door whose opening during takeoff could present an immediate hazard to the airplane. In that case the indicator must be *red* and located in plain view in front of the pilots. An aural warning is also advisable. A display on the master caution/warning system is also

acceptable as an indicator. For the purpose of complying with this paragraph, an immediate hazard is defined as significant reduction in controllability, structural damage, or impact with other structures, engines, or controls.

(c) Loss of indication or a false indication of a closed, latched, and locked condition must be improbable.

(d) A warning indication must be provided at the door operators station that monitors the door latched and locked conditions directly, unless the operator has a visual indication that the door is fully closed and locked. For example, a vent door that monitors the door locks and can be seen from the operators station would meet this requirement.

(2) Means to Visually Inspect the Locking Mechanism:

There must be a visual means of directly inspecting the locks. Where all locks are tied to a common lock shaft, a means of inspecting the locks at each end may be sufficient to meet this requirement provided no failure condition in the lock shaft would go undetected when viewing the end locks. Viewing latches may be used as an alternate to viewing locks on some installations where there are other compensating features.

(3) Means to Prevent Pressurization:

All doors must have provisions to prevent initiation of pressurization of the airplane to an unsafe level, if the door is not fully closed, latched and locked.

(4) Lock Strength:

Locks must be designed to withstand the maximum output power of the actuators and maximum expected manual operating forces treated as a limit load. Under these conditions, the door must remain closed, latched and locked.

(5) Power Availability:

All power to the door must be removed in flight and it must not be possible for the flight crew to restore power to the door while in flight.

(6) Powered Lock Systems:

For doors that have powered lock systems, it must be shown by safety analysis that inadvertent opening of the door after it is fully closed, latched and locked, is extremely improbable."

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 28, 2000.

Donald L. Riggan,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 00-19667 Filed 8-2-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-U