for not only the staff but licensees. The major vendors' core damage assessment methodologies continue to include continuous hydrogen monitoring. Core damage assessment methodologies were reviewed by the staff in response to NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3(2)(a). Continuous hydrogen monitoring is needed to support a plant's emergency plan as described in 50.47(b)(9). Implementing documents such as Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.101, Revision 2, which endorsed NUREG-0654, and RG 1.101, Revision 3, which endorsed NEI-NESP-007, Revision 2 define the highest Emergency Action Level, a General Emergency, as a loss of any two barriers and potential loss of the third barrier. Potential loss of a third barrier depends on whether or not an explosive mixture exists inside containment. The continuous hydrogen monitors are used for determining whether an explosive mixture exists inside containment. Therefore, the licensee's request for exemption from the functional requirements for hydrogen monitoring is not approved.

4.0 Conclusion

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the exemption pertaining to the recombiners is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or common defense and security, and is, otherwise, in the public interest. Also, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Duke Energy Corporation an exemption from the recombiner requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, General Design Criterion 41 for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment (66 FR 37073).

This exemption is effective upon

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of July 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John A. Zwolinski,

Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-400]

Carolina Power & Light Company; **Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering issuance of an exemption from 10 CFR 55.59(a) for Facility Operating License No. NPF-63, issued to Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee), for operation of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (HNP), located in Wake and Chatham Counties, North Carolina. Therefore, as required by 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC is issuing this environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would allow the licensed operator requalification examinations for HNP to be rescheduled. The requested exemption would extend the completion date for the examinations from December 31, 2001, to March 31, 2002.

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated January 19, 2001, as supplemented by letter dated May 7, 2001.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The proposed action would extend the current HNP requalification program from December 31, 2001, to March 31, 2002. HNP is scheduled to be in extended shutdown for refueling, steam generator replacement, and power uprate modifications during the end period of the current requalification cycle and when the full annual examination (comprehensive written examination and annual operating test) would need to be given. The licensee has stated that based on the training required for the new site procedures, modifications of the simulator to support outage modifications, training prior to the outage, and the implementation of the extended outage, the ability to complete the full annual examination within the 24-month requalification cycle is not possible.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The NRC has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and concludes that there are no environmental impacts associated with the extension of the operator requalification examinations from December 31, 2001, to March 31,

2002. The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types or amounts of effluents that may be released off site, and there is no significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Therefore, there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed action does not have a potential to affect any historic sites. It does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, there are no significant non-radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives to the Proposed Action

As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action (i.e., the "no-action" alternative). Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any different resource than those previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for HNP.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

On June 29, 2001, the staff consulted with the North Carolina State official, Mr. Johnny James, of the Division of Radiation Protection, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated January 19, 2001, as supplemented by letter dated May 7, 2001. Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from the ADAMS Public Library component on the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Public Electronic Reading Room). If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, or 301–415–4737, or by e-mail at pdr@nrc.gov.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of July 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. **N. Kalyanam**,

Project Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301]

Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an amendment to Facility
Operating License Nos. DPR–24 and
DPR–27, issued to Nuclear Management
Company, LLC, (NMC, or the licensee,
formerly Wisconsin Electric Power
Company), for operation of the Point
Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
(PBNP), respectively, located in
Manitowoc County, Wisconsin.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would be a full conversion from the current technical specifications (CTS) to a set of improved technical specifications (ITS) based on NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants," Revision 1, dated April 1995. The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated November 15, 1999, as supplemented by letters dated March 15, June 15, June 19, July 28, August 17, September 14, October 19 and December 21, 2000, February 6, February 23, March 19, May 11 and June 13, 2001.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The NRC staff has recognized that nuclear safety in all plants would benefit from improvement and

standardization of technical specifications (TSs). The "NRC Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors' (52 FR 3788) contained proposed criteria for defining the scope of TSs. Later, the "NRC Final Policy Statement on TS Improvement for Nuclear Power Reactors" (58 FR 39132) incorporated lessons learned since publication of the interim policy statement and formed the basis for a revision to 10 CFR 50.36. The "Final Rule" (60 FR 36953) codified criteria for determining the content of TSs. To facilitate the development of standard TSs, each reactor vendor owners group and the NRC staff developed standard TSs (STS). The NRC Committee to Review Generic Requirements reviewed the STS, made note of their safety merits, and indicated its support of conversion by operating plants to the STS. For Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, the STS are NUREG-1431, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse," dated April 1995. This document formed the basis for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. Units 1 and 2, conversion.

Description of the Proposed Change

The proposed changes to the CTS are based on NUREG-1431, and guidance provided in the Final Policy Statement. The objective of this action is to completely rewrite, reformat, and streamline the CTS (i.e., to convert the CTS to ITS). Emphasis is placed on human factors principles to improve clarity and understanding. The Bases section has been significantly expanded to clarify and better explain the purpose and foundation of each specification. In addition to NUREG-1431, portions of the CTS were also used as the basis for the development of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 ITS. Plantspecific issues (unique design features, requirements, and operating practices) were discussed at length with the licensee.

The proposed changes from the CTS can be grouped into four general categories. These groupings are characterized as administrative changes, technical changes—relocations, technical changes—more restrictive, and technical changes—less restrictive. They are described as follows:

Administrative changes are those that involve restructuring, renumbering, rewording, interpretation, and complex rearranging of requirements and other changes not affecting technical content or substantially revising an operating requirement. The reformatting, renumbering and rewording process reflects the attributes of NUREG—1431

and does not involve technical changes to the existing TS. The proposed changes include: (a) Identifying plantspecific wording for system names, etc., (b) changing the wording of specification titles in the CTS to conform to STS, (c) splitting up requirements that are currently grouped, or combining requirements that are currently in separate specifications, (d) deleting specifications whose applicability has expired, and (e) wording changes that are consistent with the CTS but that more clearly or explicitly state existing requirements. Such changes are administrative in nature and do not impact initiators of analyzed events or assumed mitigation of accident or transient events.

Relocation changes are those involving relocation of requirements and surveillances for structures, systems, components, or variables that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in TS. Relocated changes are those CTS requirements that do not satisfy or fall within any of the four criteria specified in the Commission's regulation, 10 CFR 50.36 and may be relocated to appropriate licensee-controlled documents.

The licensee's application of the screening criteria to PBNP is described in Attachment 6 to the November 15, 1999, submittal. The affected structures, systems, components, or variables are not assumed to be initiators of analyzed events and are not assumed to mitigate accident or transient events. The requirements and surveillances for these affected structures, systems, components, or variables, will be relocated from the TSs to administratively controlled documents such as the Final Safety Analysis Report, the ITS Bases, or other licenseecontrolled documents. Once these items have been relocated to other licenseecontrolled documents, the licensee may revise them under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 or other NRC-approved control mechanisms, which provide appropriate procedural means to control changes by the licensee.

More restrictive changes are those involving more stringent requirements compared to the CTS for operation of the facility. These more stringent requirements do not result in operation that will alter assumptions relative to the mitigation of an accident or transient event. The more restrictive requirements will not alter the operation of process variables, structures, systems, and components described in the safety analyses.

Less restrictive changes are those where CTS requirements are relaxed, relocated or eliminated, or new plant