#### **Unsafe Condition**

(d) This AD results from a fuel system review conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent improper bonding of the fill valves and defuel shutoff valve for the main fuel tanks and center wing tank, which, in combination with a lightning strike, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

## Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

## **Electrical Bonding**

(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the electrical bonding of the fill valves for the right and left main fuel tanks, the fill valve and pipe assembly for the center wing fuel tank, and the defuel shutoff valve, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 717–28–0012, Revision 1, dated June 7, 2006.

# Credit for Actions Done Using the Previous Service Information

(g) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 717–28–0012, dated April 16, 2004, are considered acceptable for compliance with the corresponding actions specified in paragraph (f) of this AD.

# Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

### Material Incorporated by Reference

(i) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 717–28–0012, Revision 1, dated June 7, 2006, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–0024).

(3) You may review copies of the service information incorporated by reference at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal\_register/ code\_of\_federal\_regulations/ibr\_ locations.html.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 11, 2008.

# Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8–926 Filed 1–18–08; 8:45 am]

## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

## **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-0185; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-246-AD; Amendment 39-15337; AD 2008-02-07]

## RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the CL-600-2B19 aircraft fuel system \* \* \*.

The assessment showed that if the fuel boost pump reducer coupling is anodized, insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pick-up line could occur. Insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pick-up line, if not corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel tank explosion. \* \* \*

We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective February 26, 2008.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of February 26, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

## FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Rocco Viselli, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE– 171, FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 228–7331; fax (516) 794–5531.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on November 13, 2007 (72 FR 63834). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the CL–600–2B19 aircraft fuel system against new fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002–043. The identified non-compliances were assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525–001 to determine if mandatory corrective action is required.

The assessment showed that if the fuel boost pump reducer coupling is anodized, insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pickup line could occur. Insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pick-up line, if not corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel tank explosion. To correct the unsafe condition, this directive mandates a detailed visual inspection of the fuel boost pump for the presence of anodized reducer couplings. All anodized couplings found are to be replaced with couplings having ion vapor deposition (IVD) coating.

You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

## Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of the cost to the public.

### Conclusion

We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

# Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a **Note** within the AD.

# **Costs of Compliance**

We estimate that this AD will affect about 509 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about 11 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about \$508 per product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these parts. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the U.S. operators to be \$706,492, or \$1,388 per product.

# **Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

# **Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:

- 1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
- 2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
- 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

# **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

## List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

# Adoption of the Amendment

■ Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

# § 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

2008–02–07 Bombardier, Inc. (Formerly Canadair): Amendment 39–15337.

Docket No. FAA–2007–0185; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–246–AD.

# **Effective Date**

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective February 26, 2008.

### Affected ADs

(b) None.

# Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes, certified in any category, serial numbers 7003 through 7067 and 7069 through 7797.

#### Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

#### Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the CL–600–2B19 aircraft fuel system against new fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002–043. The identified non-compliances were assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525–001 to determine if mandatory corrective action is required.

The assessment showed that if the fuel boost pump reducer coupling is anodized, insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pickup line could occur. Insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pick-up line, if not corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel tank explosion. To correct the unsafe condition, this directive mandates a detailed visual inspection of the fuel boost pump for the presence of anodized reducer couplings. All anodized couplings found are to be replaced with couplings having ion vapor deposition (IVD) coating.

#### **Actions and Compliance**

- (f) Unless already done, do the following
- (1) Within 5,000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, carry out a detailed inspection for the presence of an anodized (blue color) fuel boost pump reducer coupling according to the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–28–057, dated December 4, 2003.
- (2) If the results of the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD reveal that none of the fuel boost pump reducer couplings are anodized, no further action is required.
- (3) If the results of the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD reveal the presence of any anodized fuel boost pump reducer coupling, prior to further flight, replace the anodized coupling with a coupling having ion vapor deposition coating according to the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–28–057, dated December 4, 2003.

# **FAA AD Differences**

**Note:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/ or service information as follows: No differences.

## Other FAA AD Provisions

- (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
- (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Rocco Viselli, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE–171, FAA, New

York Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 228–7331; fax (516) 794–5531. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

- (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.
- (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

#### **Related Information**

(h) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2007-18, dated September 4, 2007; and Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R-28-057, dated December 4, 2003; for related information.

# Material Incorporated by Reference

- (i) You must use Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–28–057, dated December 4, 2003, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
- (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
- (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., Canadair, Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, Station Centre-ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada.
- (3) You may review copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741–6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 11, 2008.

# Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8–922 Filed 1–18–08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0045; Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-100-AD; Amendment 39-15339; AD 2008-02-09]

#### RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Przedsiebiorstwo Doswiadczalno-Produkcyjne Szybownictwa "PZL-Bielsko" Model SZD-50-3 "Puchacz" Gliders

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for

comments.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

On the pre-flight check of a SZD-50-3 glider, the Right Hand (RH) wing airbrake was found impossible to retract. Investigation revealed that the occurrence was caused by a loose bolt of the "V" shape airbrake bellcrank, named hereafter intermediate control lever. The Left Hand (LH) wing lever also presented, to a lesser extent, a loose bolt.

This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective February 1, 2008.

On February 1, 2008, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD.

We must receive comments on this AD by February 21, 2008.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
  - Fax: (202) 493-2251.
- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M—30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

## **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg Davison, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329–4130; fax: (816) 329–4090.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued Emergency AD No. 2007–0275–E, dated October 24, 2007 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

On the pre-flight check of a SZD-50-3 glider, the Right Hand (RH) wing airbrake was found impossible to retract. Investigation revealed that the occurrence was caused by a loose bolt of the "V" shape airbrake bellcrank, named hereafter intermediate control lever. The Left Hand (LH) wing lever also presented, to a lesser extent, a loose bolt.

This Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires inspection of the LH & RH wing airbrake intermediate control levers for loose attaching bolts and subsequent repetitive inspections and corrective actions, as necessary. As a terminating action, replacement of the bolts and their associated washers is required.

These actions are intended to address the identified unsafe condition so as to prevent loss of the airbrake control system which could result in an inadvertent forced landing with consequent sailplane damage and/or passenger injury.

You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

# **Relevant Service Information**

Allstar PZL Glider Sp. z o. o. has issued Service Bulletin No. BE–059/SZD–50–3/2007 "PUCHACZ," dated October 15, 2007. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.