#### TABLE 1—COMPLIANCE TIMES—Continued

Airplane models/configuration	Compliance time	
A300 B4-601, B4-603, B4-605R, B4-620, B4-622, and B4-622R airplanes on which Airbus Service Bulletin A300-57-6053 was done on or after the accumulation of 6,100 total flight cycles.		

- (2) Except as required by paragraph (f)(3) of this AD: If any crack is found during the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, before further flight, do a temporary or definitive repair, as applicable, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A300–53–0268, Revision 06, dated January 7, 2002 (for Model A300 B4–2C, B4–103, and B4–203 airplanes); or A300–57–6052, Revision 03, dated May 27, 2002, including Drawings 15R53810394, Issue A, dated December 21, 1998, and 21R57110247, Issue A, dated June 20, 1997 (for Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, B4–605R, B4–620, B4–622, and B4–622R airplanes).
- (3) If any crack found during the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD cannot be repaired in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A300–53–0268, Revision 06, dated January 7, 2002; or A300–57–6052, Revision 03, dated May 27, 2002: Contact Airbus for repair instructions and before further flight repair the crack using a method approved by the Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA.
- (4) Submit an inspection report in accordance with Appendix 01 of Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300–53A0387, dated September 12, 2008 (for Model A300 B4–2C, B4–103, and B4–203 airplanes); or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300–57A6108, dated September 12, 2008 (for Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, B4–605R, B4–620, B4–622, and B4–622R airplanes); to the

- address identified on the reporting sheet, at the applicable time specified in paragraph (f)(4)(i) or (f)(4)(ii) of this AD.
- (i) If the inspection was done on or after the effective date of this AD: Submit the report within 30 days after the inspection.
- (ii) If the inspection was done before the effective date of this AD: Submit the report within 30 days after the effective date of this AD.

#### **FAA AD Differences**

Note 2: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: Although the MCAI or Airbus Service Bulletin A300–53–0268, Revision 06, dated January 7, 2002; or A300–57–6052, Revision 03, dated May 27, 2002; allows further flight after cracks are found during compliance with the required action, paragraph (f)(3) of this AD requires that you repair the cracks before further flight.

### Other FAA AD Provisions

- (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
- (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate,

- FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2125; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
- (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.
- (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

## **Related Information**

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 2009– 0094, dated April 21, 2009 (*Correction:* May 29, 2009); and the applicable service information specified in Table 2 of this AD for related information.

# TABLE 2—RELATED SERVICE INFORMATION

Document	Revision	Date
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300–53A0387, including Appendices 01 and 02	Original 06	January 7, 2002.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 19, 2009.

# Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E9–25864 Filed 10–27–09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

# **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

# **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0994; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-108-AD]

# RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Dassault Model Falcon 900EX Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

A quality control performed during completion of one Falcon 900EX aeroplane

has shown that the crew and passenger Right-Hand (RH) oxygen lines may both interfere with the frame 8 of the aeroplane structure. A subsequent design review of the oxygen lines routing has confirmed that, on certain aeroplanes, equipped in RH mid-cabin with a 115 cu-ft oxygen cylinder, the installation of the line support assembly at frame 8 needs to be accomplished with precaution; otherwise, the oxygen lines might interfere with the structure, and this condition could lead to an oxygen leak.

\* \* \* \* \*

The unsafe condition is an oxygen leak, which would result in insufficient oxygen flow to passenger oxygen masks during a depressurization event. The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by December 14, 2009.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
  - Fax: (202) 493–2251.
- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M— 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Dassault Falcon Jet, P.O. Box 2000, South Hackensack, New Jersey 07606; telephone 201–440–6700; Internet http://www.dassaultfalcon.com. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221 or 425–227–1152.

## **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

# **Comments Invited**

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include "Docket No. FAA—2009—0994; Directorate Identifier 2009—NM—108—AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We have lengthened the 30-day comment period for proposed ADs that address MCAI originated by aviation authorities of other countries to provide adequate time for interested parties to submit comments. The comment period for these proposed ADs is now typically 45 days, which is consistent with the comment period for domestic transport ADs.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

#### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2009–0126, dated June 18, 2009 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

A quality control performed during completion of one Falcon 900EX aeroplane has shown that the crew and passenger Right-Hand (RH) oxygen lines may both interfere with the frame 8 of the aeroplane structure. A subsequent design review of the oxygen lines routing has confirmed that, on certain aeroplanes, equipped in RH mid-cabin with a 115 cu-ft oxygen cylinder, the installation of the line support assembly at frame 8 needs to be accomplished with precaution; otherwise, the oxygen lines might interfere with the structure, and this condition could lead to an oxygen leak.

As a result, [EASA] Airworthiness Directive 2009–0104 was issued to require inspection of the oxygen lines [for signs of interference or chafing damage], replacement of any damaged lines and modification of their support assembly. Since then, it has been found that the applicability of the AD had not been correctly defined.

This [new EASA] AD retains the requirements of AD 2009–0104 which is superseded and corrects the applicability.

The unsafe condition is an oxygen leak, which would result in insufficient oxygen flow to passenger oxygen masks during a depressurization event. Modifying the support assembly of the oxygen lines includes drilling holes to install improved support bracket assemblies at frame 8, stringers 11 and 13, and installing the improved assemblies. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

#### **Relevant Service Information**

Dassault has issued Mandatory Service Bulletin F900EX–347, Revision 1, dated May 18, 2009. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

# FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

# Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a note within the proposed AD.

#### **Costs of Compliance**

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 23 products of U.S. registry.

We also estimate that it would take about 4 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Required parts would cost about \$0 per product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be \$7,360, or \$320 per product.

#### **Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

## **Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

- 1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
- 2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
- 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with

this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

#### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Dassault Aviation: Docket No. FAA-2009-0994; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-108-AD.

#### **Comments Due Date**

(a) We must receive comments by December 14, 2009.

#### Affected ADs

(b) None.

#### Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Dassault Model Falcon 900EX airplanes, certificated in any category, with serial numbers 120 through 123 inclusive, 125 through 127 inclusive, 129, 132, 134 through 145 inclusive, 147, 151, 153, 155, 157 through 159 inclusive, 163, 165, 168 through 170 inclusive, 172, 174, 178, 182, 183, 194, 196, 197, 199, and 206.

#### Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 35: Oxygen.

#### Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

A quality control performed during completion of one Falcon 900EX aeroplane has shown that the crew and passenger Right-Hand (RH) oxygen lines may both interfere with the frame 8 of the aeroplane structure. A subsequent design review of the oxygen lines routing has confirmed that, on certain aeroplanes, equipped in RH mid-cabin with a 115 cu-ft oxygen cylinder, the installation of the line support assembly at frame 8 needs to be accomplished with precaution; otherwise, the oxygen lines might interfere with the structure, and this condition could lead to an oxygen leak.

As a result, [European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)] Airworthiness Directive 2009–0104 was issued to require inspection of the oxygen lines [for signs of interference and chafing damage], replacement of any damaged lines and modification of their support assembly. Since then, it has been

found that the applicability of the AD had not been correctly defined.

This [EASA] AD retains the requirements of AD 2009–0104 which is superseded and corrects the applicability.

The unsafe condition is an oxygen leak, which would result in insufficient oxygen flow to passenger oxygen masks during a depressurization event. Modifying the support assembly of the oxygen lines includes drilling holes to install improved support bracket assemblies at frame 8, stringers 11 and 13, and installing the improved assemblies.

# **Actions and Compliance**

- (f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
- (1) Within 2 months after the effective date of this AD, inspect the oxygen lines in accordance with Part 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Dassault Mandatory Service Bulletin F900EX–347, Revision 1, dated May 18, 2009. If any interference or damage is found, before further flight, replace the oxygen lines and install improved brackets, in accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Dassault Mandatory Service Bulletin F900EX–347, Revision 1, dated May 18, 2009.
- (2) If no interference and no damage are found during the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD: Within 72 months after the effective date of this AD, replace the oxygen line support assemblies, in accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Dassault Mandatory Service Bulletin F900EX–347, Revision 1, dated May 18, 2009.
- (3) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Dassault Mandatory Service Bulletin F900EX–347, dated March 19, 2009, are acceptable for compliance with corresponding actions specified in this AD.

#### **FAA AD Differences**

**Note 1:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

# Other FAA AD Provisions

- (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
- (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
- (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from

a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

#### **Related Information**

(h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2009–0126, dated June 18, 2009; and Dassault Mandatory Service Bulletin F900EX–347, Revision 1, dated May 18, 2009; for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 19, 2009.

#### Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E9–25865 Filed 10–27–09; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

### **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

#### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0568; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-20-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

## Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca Arriel 2S1 Turboshaft Engines

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During acceleration up to One Engine Inoperative (OEI) 30-second rating, one event of flight loss of full automatic control occurred on an Arriel 2S1 engine. The selection of OEI 30second rating on engine 1 was triggered by the automatic detection of an OEI situation further to a transient deceleration of engine 2. The transient deceleration of engine 2 was caused by the untimely reset of its DECU. Once this reset was completed, engine 2 resumed its nominal operation.

Afterwards the aircraft then continued its flight safely with its engine 1 operating in manual control mode. The loss of full automatic control of engine 1 was caused by loss of steps of the stepper motor controlling the fuel metering valve inside the Hydromechanical Unit (HMU). It has been found that high accelerations, notably up to OEI 30-second rating, increase the risk of loss of steps of the HMU stepper motor. Therefore, this event has led to the consideration of the following unsafe condition at aircraft level: In-flight loss of full automatic control of the engine induced by the loss of steps of the stepper motor during acceleration up to OEI 30-second rating, further to an actual OEI situation on the other engine (such as a power loss event).

We are proposing this AD to prevent loss of full automatic control of the engine during acceleration up to the OEI 30-second rating. This condition could result in reduced controllability of the helicopter.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by November 27, 2009.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
- *Mail:* Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC 20590–0001.
- Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
  - Fax: (202) 493–2251.

## **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is the same as the Mail address provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238–7176; fax (781) 238–7199.

Contact Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15 for the service information identified in this AD.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### **Comments Invited**

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2009-0568; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-20-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of the Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including, if provided, the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

#### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2009–0010, dated January 20, 2009 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

During acceleration up to One Engine Inoperative (OEI) 30-second rating, one event of flight loss of full automatic control occurred on an Arriel 2S1 engine.

The selection of OEI 30-second rating on engine 1 was triggered by the automatic detection of an OEI situation further to a transient deceleration of engine 2. The transient deceleration of engine 2 was caused by the untimely reset of its DECU. Once this reset was completed, engine 2 resumed its nominal operation. Afterwards the aircraft then continued its flight safely with its engine 1 operating in manual control mode.

The loss of full automatic control of engine 1 was caused by loss of steps of the stepper