Antenna Mast Groups (AMG), three (3) Electrical Power Plants (EPP) III, two (2) AN/MPQ-65 Radar Sets (RS), and two (2) AN/MSQ-132 Engagement Control Stations (ECS). Also included is communications equipment, tools and test equipment, range and test programs, support equipment, prime movers, generators, publications and technical documentation, training equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training, Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT), U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, Systems Integration and Checkout (SICO), field office support, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $2.478 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a Major Non-NATO ally which is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key allies in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

The proposed sale will enhance Bahrain's interoperability with the United States. Bahrain will use Patriot to improve its missile defense capability, defend its territorial integrity, and deter regional threats. Bahrain will have no difficulty absorbing this system into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of these missiles will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor for the PAC-3 Missile is Lockheed-Martin in Dallas, Texas. The prime contractor for the GEM-T missile is Raytheon Company in Andover, Massachusetts. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require approximately 25 U.S. Government and 40 contractor representatives to travel to Bahrain for an extended period for equipment de-processing/fielding, system checkout, training, and technical and logistics support.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 19-06

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex

Item No. vii

(vii) *Sensitivity of Technology*:

1. The Patriot Air Defense System contains classified CONFIDENTIAL hardware components, SECRET tactical software and critical/sensitive technology. Patriot ground support equipment and Patriot missile hardware contain CONFIDENTIAL components and the associated launcher hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. The items requested represent significant technological advances for Bahrain. The Patriot Air Defense System continues to hold a significant technology lead over other surface-to-air missile systems in the world.

2. The Patriot sensitive/critical technology is primarily in the area of design and production know-how and primarily inherent in the design, development and/or manufacturing data related to certain components. The list of components is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

3. Information on system performance capabilities, effectiveness, survivability, missile seeker capabilities, select software/software documentation and test data are classified up to and including SECRET.

4. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures or equivalent systems which might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

5. A determination has been made that the Government of Bahrain can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

6. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Bahrain.

[FR Doc. 2019–12917 Filed 6–18–19; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Docket ID DOD–2019–OS–0068]

Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records

AGENCY: Defense Logistics Agency, DoD.

ACTION: Rescindment of a system of records notice.

SUMMARY: The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is rescinding a system of records, S240.28 DoD, Case Adjudication Tracking System (CATS). This system of records recorded and documented personnel security adjudicative actions within the Department, federal agencies, and for DoD contractors. The system also provided a status of investigative and adjudicative updates to security officers, managers and other authorized users. With the transfer of responsibility for CATS from DLA to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), and subsequent publication of the DMDC 24 DoD, Defense Information System for Security (DISS), system of records notice, the DLA CATS system of records is no longer in use as it is subsumed within the DISS system of records. All records previously covered by the DLA CATS system of records are now covered by the DISS system of records.

DATES: This notice is applicable upon publication.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: To submit general questions about the rescinded system, please contact Mr. Lewis Oleinick, Chief FOIA and Privacy Act Officer, Defense Logistics Agency, Office of General Counsel, ATTN: DGA, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 1644, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060–6221, or by phone at (703) 767–6193.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October 2, 2014, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed Memorandum OSD010147, directing the transfer of the Defense Travel System (DTS) and the Defense Information System for Security (DISS) programs from DLA to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), a component of the Defense Human Resources Agency (DHRA). On July 27, 2015, DHRA and DLA signed a Memorandum of Agreement transferring operational and budgetary responsibility from DLA to DHRA. On June 15, 2016, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD, published a new system of records, DMDC 24 DoD, Defense Information System for Security (DISS) (81 FR 39032). The DISS system of records is comprised of the Case Adjudication Tracking System (CATS) and the Joint Verification System (JVS).

The DLA CATS system of records has been subsumed within the DISS system of records and all records previously covered by the DLA CATS system of records are now covered by the DISS system of records. The Defense Logistics Agency systems of records notices subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), as amended, have been published in the **Federal Register** and are available from the address in **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** or at the Defense Privacy, Civil Liberties and Transparency Division website at *http://dpcld.defense.gov/Privacy/SORNs/.*

The proposed systems reports, as required by the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, were submitted on January 15, 2019, to the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and on February 5, 2019, to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) pursuant to Section 6 to OMB Circular No. A–108, ''Federal Agency Responsibilities for Review, Reporting, and Publication under the Privacy Act,'' revised December 23, 2016 (December 23, 2016, 81 FR 94424).

SYSTEM NAME AND NUMBER

Case Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), S240.28 DoD

HISTORY:

July 09, 2015, 80 FR 39418

Dated: June 13, 2019.

Aaron T. Siegel,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 2019–12945 Filed 6–18–19; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Recommendation 2019–02

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; Recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a Recommendation to the Secretary of Energy concerning adequate protection of public health and safety in the event of an energetic accident at the Tritium Facilities at the Savannah River Site. Pursuant to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is publishing the Recommendation and associated correspondence with the Department of Energy and requesting comments from interested members of the public.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the recommendation are due on or by July 19, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Send comments concerning this notice to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2001. Comments may also be submitted by e-mail to *comment@dnfsb.gov.*

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Glenn Sklar at the address above or telephone number (202) 694–7000.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Recommendation 2019–2 to the Secretary of Energy

Safety of the Savannah River Site Tritium Facilities

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(b)(5)

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended

Introduction. The Tritium Facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) consist of several defense nuclear facilities, including the 217–H Vault, Buildings 233–H and 234–H, and the Tritium Extraction Facility, used for processing and storing tritium. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is concerned about adequate protection of the public health and safety in the event of an energetic accident at the Tritium Facilities.

The facilities' approved Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and the November 2018 revision to the DSA awaiting approval by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the Department of Energy (DOE) both have analyzed several credible accidents that could result in very high doses, creating the potential for acute radiation sickness or fatality [1] in a significant number of individuals. These energetic accidents include building-wide fires due to a variety of initiating events, crane drops, and explosions with the potential to release large quantities of tritium.

The probability of such an event within the lifetime of the facility is not negligible. Assuming a 50-year lifetime for the facilities, the probability that an unlikely event could occur within that time period ranges from 0.5 percent to about 40 percent. Such an event could lead to a significant number of potentially exposed individuals, posing a significant challenge to both SRS's emergency management system and to local emergency and medical facilities.

The current situation at the Tritium Facilities does not adequately address either DOE's standards of care or standards of practice as defined by its own requirements. Consequently, adequate protection is not assured. The Board has concluded that DOE needs to take actions to improve the safety of the Tritium Facilities, upgrades to safety management programs and the implementation of robust controls to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety.[2]

Recommendations. The Board recommends that DOE:

1. Identify and implement near-term compensatory measures at SRS to mitigate the potential for high radiological consequences to individuals who would be impacted by a release from the Tritium Facilities. (For example, potential near-term compensatory measures could include, but are not limited to reducing the material at risk (MAR) and/or limiting the number of potentially exposed individuals or other physical or administrative controls.)

2. Identify and implement long-term actions and controls to prevent or mitigate the hazards that pose significant radiological consequences to acceptably low values consistent with the requirements of DOE directives.

3. In parallel with the above recommendations, evaluate the adequacy of the following safety management programs and upgrade them as necessary to ensure that SRS can effectively respond to energetic accidents at the Tritium Facilities, and that it can quickly identify and properly treat potential victims:

a. The staffing and training requirements for individuals expected to take specific actions in response to alarms, abnormal operations, and emergencies;

b. The adequacy of the Emergency Preparedness programs in H-Area to account for all individuals in the vicinity and ensure that all potentially affected individuals understand their responsibilities and required actions in the event of a large tritium release from

[1] Acute radiation-induced sickness and acute radiation fatality, as used in this report, refers to possible outcomes of the acute radiation syndrome. This syndrome is the result of an acute, or short duration, exposure to a very high level of ionizing radiation. In this context, the word acute does not imply immediate incapacitation or death, as the syndrome and its impact on a human body may take hours to months to progress to recovery or death.

[2] The Board has raised concerns regarding the safety posture at the Tritium facilities since 1992. The Board's concerns over the potential for energetic accidents with very high calculated dose consequences have been frequently communicated to DOE. DOE has routinely responded to the Board's concerns with improvements in the safety controls, only to allow those controls to be downgraded after a number of years. (See the Attachment for a list of previous Board correspondence.)